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PITFALLS IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND USE
OF EFFECTIVE TAXRATES
ABSTRACT
A cost of capital formula can be a useful toolin estimating the
effective tax rate on a dollar of marginal investmentin a particular
industry. There are a number of proceduralissues, however, which can
greatly affect the resultingestimates. First, tax rate estimates vary
with the interest rate used in the formula.Second, the nonlinearity of
tax rate formulas may lead to anomalousresults. For example, an invest-
ment that is actually subsidized may appearto bear a positive tax. Or,
tax rates may become arbitrarily largewhen the project's rate of return
approaches zero. Third, effective tax rateresults depend on the assumed
relationship between inflation and nominal interestrates. Our conclusion
is that much sensitivity analysis and specificityare required in studies
that undertake to estimate effective tax rates.
David F. Bradford
Don Fullerton









The easiest and most common approach to estimating effective tax
rateson investment has been to calculate actual taxes paid as a proportion
of capital income. This "flow of funds" approach is particularly useful
for income effects to capital owners, revenue effects to government, or
generally for discussing the relative size of the public sector.Some have
also used this approach to capture the different incentive effects for
using capital in different industries. The implicit assumptionis that
marginal tax rates in a given industry are not far from the ratioof actual
taxes to capital income in that industry. Harberger (1966)estimated the
efficiency cost of differential capital income taxation using this approach,
as did Shoven in his (1976) correction to Harberger. The approachis still
used in recent general equilibrium estimates by Fullerton, King, Shoven,and
Whalley (1981).
A new approach is now emerging, based on the pioneering workof Hall
and Jorgenson (1967). Their cost of cajiital formulas have long beenused
to analyze investment and the incentive effects of tax policy changes.More
recently, the formulas have been used to estimate effective marginaltax
rates, as in Hall (1981) and Jorgenson and Sullivan (J—S,1981). Tax rates
based on the cost of capital approach have been used to recalculate Harberger—
type efficiency costs, as in Gravelle (1981), and to recomputegeneral
equilibrium effects, as in Fullerton and Gordon (1981).—2—
This newer approach considers a "hypothetical project" of a dollar
invested in a particular asset to be used in a particular industry.
(Some versions of the approach also assume that the investment is main-
tained in real or nominal tens by subsequent reinvestment.) The view of
taxes is prospective in the sense that the cost of capital formula looks
at the expected change in future tax liabilities, usually discounted to
the time that the original investment takes place. The method can simul-
taneously incorporate actual depreciation rates, type of finance, eligibility
for investment tax credit, accelerated depreciation rules, and depreciation
at historical cost. It is greatly facilitated by the availability of
estimates for depreciation rates of different assets, such as those in
Hulten and Wycoff (1981).
The prospective nature of the cost of capital (hypothetical project)
approach implies that it is probably more useful for investigating incentive
effects. It measures the expected tax consequences if a given investment
is undertaken. It also concentrates on marginal effects by considering a
particular unit of investment. Though we see many potential benefits of
using this approach, the purpose of this paper is to investigate some of its
dangers. In particular,we thall illustrate three points that should be consid-
ered by any study which uses the cost of capital approach.
First, as mentioned above, the cost of capital method considers the
expected future tax liabilities associated with a hypothetical project,
discounted to the time that the original investment takes place. Though
the investment tax credit has immediate consequences, other features of
tax systems do not. Accelerated depreciation, for example, has the effect
of delaying some tax liability. As a result, effective tax rate estimates—3—
will necessarily depend upon the after—tax interest rate or other rate
used for discounting. We shall show this sensitivity below by plotting
a tax rate estimate against the interest rate used to obtain it.
Second, the tax law allows some assets to be depreciated at rates faster
than their values decline. With Investment tax credits and with the deduc-
tibility of nominal Interest payments, the asset need not earn a positive
marginal product for the investor to receive a normal return. Thoughthe
implied subsidy might be measured In a meaningful way, the rateof subsidy
might not be. When the investment's return in the denominatorof an ef-
fective tax rate formula approaches zero, the rate of subsidy can be arbitrarily
high. Similarly, on an asset with a low real return, a positive tax can
be an arbitrarily high portion of it. This problem can bedealt
with by using the numerators of these tax rate estimates alone to
describe the effective tax wedge on a particular asset in a particular
industry.
-
Third,effective tax rate estimates depend on assumptions about how
inflation affects nominal interest rates. Hall (1981) andJ—S (1981) ef-
fectively assume that nominal interest rates increase bythe inflation rate
over one minus the corporate tax rate. Thisincrease is just enough to keep
the real after—tax interest rate constant for corporations.If all tax-
payers faced the same tax rate as corporations,and if the rules for measur-
ing the income from real investments were perfectlyindexed for inflation,
then a strong a priori case could be made for thisbehaviOr of interest
rates. The real consequences of given decisionsto borrow, lend, and in-
vest would then be independent of inflation rates.However, historical
cost depreciation, nonuniform tax rates, andother tax features tend to—4—
weaken this a priori case. Indeed, Feldstein (1980) has arguedthat the
monetary authorities have acted so as to imposeFisher's Law, keeping the
real before—tax interest rate invariant with respect to inflation.We
show below how tax rate estimates differ according towhether nominal
interest rates increase by just the rate of inflation, or by enoughto
keep real after—tax rates constant.
This paper does not seek to estimate new or better effective tax
rates. It only seeks to investigate the sensitivityof existing estimates
to some of the issues just described. These can be clarified adequately
within the context of fairly simple and straightforward costof capital
formulas such as those used by Hall (1981) and 3—S (1981). Inorder to be
particularly careful about the assumptions used in this procedure,we rederive
the cost of capital in Section 11.1. In order to be particularlycareful about
what is being estimated, we describe an array of possible tax ratedefinitions
in Section 11.2. Then in Section 11.3, we state the parametersof the invest-
ment and tax systems, chosen for comparability with Hall (1981).We also dis-
play the possible outcomes for savers and investment returns.These consti-
tute the components of effective tax rates.
In the three parts of Section III, we elaborate on each of the three is-
sues raised above. Tax rate estimates are shown to be sensitive tothe interest
rate in Section 111.1. The fact that tax rate definitions are verynonlinear
relationships is illustrated in Section 111.2. The effect of inflation on
nominal interest rates also significantly affects the estimates, as shown
in Section 111.3. It should be clear by the end of thispaperthat the
sensitivity of tax rate estimates implies that one can obtain a wide variety
oftaxrate estimates with different choices of parameter values and other
assumptions.—5—
Theproblems emphasized in this paper involve primarily mechanical features
ofthe analysis. That is, theyconcern potential. misunderstanding of thetax
rate formulas and of the assumptions often encountered. We also touch on some
underlying modelling problems through the course of the paper. Foremost among
these is the question of the true relationship between inflation and the inter-
est rate. There are, however, several additional aspects of the use of ef-
fective tax rate estimates which deserve attention. In the concluding remarks
of Section IV, we allude to further work we are doing on these problems.
II. Analytical Framework
Because we feel that previous studies have not been explicit enough
about what they were estimating, we devote considerable attention atthe
outset to deriving and defining different sorts of tax rates. Anyof these
might be estimated by a particular study.
11.1. The Cost of Capital
We begin with a simple expression for the cost of capital, that is,
the anmial market rental price of a unit of capital, predicted toobtain in
a competitive market equilibrium. Although a similarderivation has been
exposited many times, it will be helpful to have a restatement of the
underlying assumptions and the interpretations of differentvariables.
Define pto be the expected real rate of return to the hypothetical
project, net of economic depreciation at the exponential rate In
lightof our introductory coimnents, we require a model incorporating the
dependence of p on the nominal interest rate i and on the rateof infla-
tion ir.However, many complexities can be safely ignored. Hall (1981),for
example, considers (but does not really use) the possibility that a proportion
of accrued capital gains are taxable at the statutory corporate tax rate u.—6—
3—S (1981), on the other hand, allow for (but then abstract from) the possi-
bility that the acquisitiox cost q and the rental price c of the asset
are arbitrary functions of time, rather than assuming only that they increase
with inflation. 3—S also consider the possibility that the rate of economic
depreciation is an arbitrary function of time, rather than using our simpler
assumption that true depreciation is at constant exponential rate6. They
allow depreciation deductions as an arbitrary function of time, while we
assume the tax law allows deprec4tion deductions on a historical cost
basis at constant exponential rate 6'.
An investment tax credit at rate k completes the description of our
hypothetical real investment project and its tax consequences. A corpor-
ate purchaser of a unit of real capital incurs an immediate after—tax—credit
expense of (1—k)q, and subsequently obtains a cash inflow, expressedas
a function of t, the time since acquisition of the asset. Thiscash inflow
includes rental at a rate that starts at c and grows at the rate of infla-
tion iT.The quantity of capital embodied in the investment declines at
the depreciation rate 6. At time t the rental receipts thus equal
(1_u)ce)t after the corporate income tax. The cash inf low also
includes tax reductions due to depreciation allowances, which at time t
equal uq6te_6t (depreciation at rate 6' is allowed on the remaining
basis qe6t). By changing k u and 6', the tax authorities change
the attractiveness of these net—of—tax cash flows, given q, c and iT.
Since (at least) q and c are endogenous to the system, changes in the
tax rules will ultimately be reflected in changes in the values of q, C,
or both.
The power of the analysis is based upon the valuation of such cash flows.
More specifically, it is based on valuation relative to available alternatives.—7—
Prominent among these alternatives is the purchase or sale of debt. The
analogue of buying a machine is buying debt, or lending. If the market interest
rate i is constant, for an intial outlay of $1, a corporation can accummulate
dollars by time t,wherethe factor (1—u) in the exponent re-
flects the taxation of interest receipts. Of course, most nonfinancial cor-
porations are sellers of debt, not buyers. The emphasis therefore is usually
on the deduction of interest outlays and not the taxation of interest receipts.
Note that this deduction is a logical extension of the taxation of interest
receipts. It is not, as sometimes made to appear, an explicit subsidy of
corporate borrowing.
If borrowing and lending are unconstrained, and if real investment is
riskless, it is possible for a corporation to undertake offsetting transactions,
by selling debt and buying an equal amount of real capital. Explicitly or
implicitly, most analyses depend upon the elimination of any possible pure
surpluses from such transactions to determine the equilibrium relationship
among i, q, and c(given iiandthe tax rules). More prosaically, most
analyses represent the corporation as discounting nominal cash flows at the
"after tax nominal interest rate," (l—u)i.
In equilibrium, then, the present value of the nominal cash flow from
a unit of capital, as summarized above, must just equal the initial outlay.
This implies
(l—k)qJ (l_u)ceteiTdT + J uq5Ie Te hidi. (1)
Explicit integration leads to a relatively simple relationship between the—8—





Thisis our basic equation for later computations. Note that this equilibri-
um condition is independent of the actual financing method of the corpora-
tion; it does not matter whether the source of the investment funds is debt
or equity. The option of arbitrage between debt andrealcapital implies
3/
equation (2).—
Since the original Hall and Jorgenson treatment of this subject
(1967), the notation z has been the conventional symbol for the discounted
sum of depreciation deductions on a one dollar investment. Therefore (2)
can also be written as
c 6+(1—u)i—ir —=
1—u (l—k—uz) , (3)
where it must be remembered that z depends upon i andu.
For changes in the tax parameters u, k, and 6', it is conceptu-
ally straightforward to calculate the effect on the equilibrium social rate
of return, p, which equals c/q —6.This canbedone for different
combinations of i and TI.Commonly,though, a further simplification is
adopted, namely, an assumed relationship between i and .Thisreduces the
number of cases to consider, for the whole system described by (2) then has
a single exogenous parameter, rr.—"Whileanumber of relationships are—9—
possible, two particular assumptions about inflationand the nominal interest
rate are often encountered. The first is a strictversion of Fisher's Law.
If we let i0 represent the interest rate presumed to prevailin the absence
of inflation, Strict Fisher's Law says that
j=i+,t . (4a)
The argument for this result is simply that this adjustmentleaves all real
borrowing and lending opportunities independentof the rate of inflation.
Implicit is the absence of taxes on interest.With a tax at a flat rate u
on net interest receipts (which implies adeduction for interest payments),
the same argument predicts what might be called ModifiedFisher's Law:'
ii+7
. (4b)
Theory does not give us firm predictions about the relationship betweeni
and ir in a world of imperfect income measurement rules, diverse marginal
tax rates, nonlinearities, noise, and other considerations. Feldstein
and Summers (1978) estimate that i has varied slightly less than point
for point with itin the U. S. since World War II. On the other hand, Hall
(1981) explicitly assumes Modified Fisher's Law. J—S (1981)postulate
constancy of the real. rate of return on investmentafter the corporate tax,
citing empirical work by Fraumeni and Jorgenson (1981).This procedure is
equivalent to assuming Modified Fisher's Law when arbitragewith corporate
bonds is encompassed by themodel.'— 10—
Laterwe consider the choice between (4a) and (4b). For our illustra-
tive calculations, we consider three situations: no inflation, 10 percent in-
flation with equation (4a), and 10 percent inflation with equation (4b). The
real interest rate to a bondholder with no tax is the same in the first two
scenarios, but the real interest rate after tax at rate u differs. En the
first and third scenarios, the real after corporate tax interest rate (1—u)i—Tr
is the same, but the real interest rate for a non—profit (nontaxable) insti-
tution differs. There is no real interest rate which is the same in all three
cases, and so we studiously avoid defining any parameter as the real after—tax
interest rate. Instead, we take as a basis of comparison the interest rate
ithat would prevail with no inflation.
0
11.2.Effective Tax Rates
The concept of an effective tax rate on capital refers to some measure
of the difference between p, the real social rate of return earned on a
real asset, ands, defined as the rate of return received by the person




This wedge can be thought of as an annual levy on the specified financer
with respect to a dollar's worth of the asset in question. It may be either
positive or negative.
It is usual to express t' as a ratio to either the social return or
the saver's return. The first is a tax rate on a base that includes the tax:
a "tax inclusive" rate in the language of the Meade Report (1978). Since the— 11—
baseis gross—of—tax, we refer to it as a "gross tax rate" The other tax
rate is on a "tax.exclusive" or net—of—tax basis, and is referred to here as





Notice that these rates are nonlinear functions of $andp, and may
behave rather erratically in some circumstances. Particular care must be used
where the denominator of one of these formulas approaches zero, or passes
from positive to negative. In later sections we shall see examples of the
practical relevance of this erratic behavior.
Different values of p and s can be derived for
(a) assets with different depreciation rates 6,
(b) assets with different tax rules (6' and k),
(c) savers with different tax circumstances (u, in),
(d)different types of finance (bonds, stock, direct ownership),
and
(e) different i and itcombinations.
In particular,we shall focus on"effective corporate tax rate", a "total
effectiverate of tax on bond financed corporate investment", and a"total
effective rate of tax on equity financed investment."
In performing this analysis however, there is some question as to what
should be taken as constant. Since the interest rate i is a price estab-
lished on a market in which all can trade, it is arguably the natural fixed— 12—
point.Given this interest rate and a single tax rate u for all traders,
the social return p would be determined by the equilibrium condition (2)
for arbitrage between bonds and real capital. In concluding remarks we touch up-
on the possibility of corporate and noncorporate arbitragers with different
tax rates. For now,however, we make the customary assumption that the mar-
ket is dominated by corporations with tax rate u.Because the corpora-
tion arbitrages between real capital and bonds yielding (l—u)i—ir, it is
either a borrower or lender at that real after—tax interest rate. In this
sense, we can take cJ.—u)i—rr as the net return to savings of the corporation,
S.c
Thus, the corporate tax wedge, the effective gross rate, and the effective









Note that the model developed in the previous section implies p and i
are functionally related to each other, and I is functionally related to
n. Hence the model implies values for the corporate tax wedge and the
corporate effective tax rates as functions of 71.
If we imagine a corporation choosing to purchase a dollar's worth of
real assets with some funds it has in the bank, the net of tax real return
must be (l—u)I—7T; otherwise (2) would not be satisfied. This can be thought— 13—
ofas income to the stockholders, who are taxed on it at marginal rate rn.
This personal rate is designed to capture the effective personal tax on these
earnings when part. may be paid as dividends and part retained. It should
also account for the low effective personal rate on accrued capital gains
resulting from retentions. The net return to stockholders on equity is thus
=
(l_rne)[(1_u)i_'Tr].The tax wedge on equity, the effective gross rate,










An individual debtholder with marginal tax ratemd receives a real
return on bonds of (l—rnd)i—TT after taxes. Call this returnsd.We are
entitled to compare to the social return on corporate investment, and
the difference is customarily referred to as the effective tax on corporate
investment financed by debt. Thus the tax wedge on debt, the effective gross








Intwo senses, these effective tax rates have nothing to do with
whether the investment is actually financed by issue of debt. First, because
i is a market interest rate, any debtholder with tax rate md will earn
The corporation earns p on a particular investment. The values p and Sd
are all that is required to define the effective tax rates, independentlyof
any connection between the two. Second, when the corporationmakes its
real investment decisions by comparing the returns on capital and debt, there
is a connection between p and i. This relationship depends on potential
and not actual arbitrage, however. Thus the td expressions are not only
defined, but relevant for analysis regardless of whether debt finance is
actually used.
Two points may be noted from these formulas before we proceedto illustrate
them. First,if the personal rate md happens to equal the corporate rate u,
then the total tax on debt (equation 10) is equivalentto the corporate
rate alone (equation 8). When Hall or J—S reporteffective corporate tax
rates we can reinterpret them as total tax rates t on adebt
financed investment where the lender has a tax rate md equal to u.
Second, if md is zero, then equation (10) implies
g —p—(i-ir)=(c/q—ó)—(i—r1) (11)
td — p (c/q—)
If we use equations (2) and (4b) to obtain p,this is exactly the tax rate
on debt calculated by Hall (1981). ThusHall's tax rates on debt can be
thought of as the lowest extremes of a spectrumfrom IfldO to mdu. For
the other extreme, we can simply look atthe effective corporate tax rate
Below, we reproduce Hall's results and thenrecalculate them for dif—
C— 15—
ferentreal net of tax interest rates and for different assumptions about
how inflation affects nominal interest rates.
The various eftective tax rate expressions are drawn together and summarized
in Table 1.
11.3. Parameter Values
Having specified the mechanisms determining the social rate of return
and the saver's rate of return, we can explore the behavior of the various
effective tax rates under different assumptions about parameters. Hall
(1981) has chosen a particular classification of investment types and saver
types; it will facilitate our discussion to adopt the same parameter values.
First, take u to be .46, the marginal tax rate for corporations where
nearly all corporate investment takes place. Formd. Hall uses a value
of zero, on the assumption that all bonds are held by tax—exempt institu-
tions. As we have mentioned, we can also consider the case ofmdu=.4€ with
no extra calculations or table space. Thirdly, let m equal .28, the
value chosen by Hall. He assumes that the typical stockholder is in the
40 percent bracket, receiving one—half of corporate equity income as fully
taxable dividends and the other half as capital gains. Only 40 percent of
the latter are included in the individual income tax base. We regard the
figure of .28 as somewhat high. The value of deferral and of the write—up
of capital gains basis at death probably cut the effective proportion of
accrued gains included in taxable income to something like 20
With this assumption,me would be .24. For purposes of illustrating the
characteristics of the tax system, however, the difference is not of much
importance.
Hall identifies three real assets. "Equipment" depreciates at 10 per—Superscripts
— 16—
TABLE1











centper year, receives a 10 percent investment tax credit, and is allowed
depreciation deductions at 15 percent per year. "Structures" depreciate at
an annual rate of 3 percent, receive no investment tax credit, but are allowed
accelerated depreciation deductions at 6 percent per year. Finally, "in-
tangibles" (e.g. advertising or R&D) are assumed to depreciate at 10 percent,
receive no tax credit, but may be written off immediately.These asset character-
istics are summarized in Table 2. Tax rate estimates will be sensitive to these
assumed parameters, but they do represent plausible examples of real asset charac-
teristics. Notice that equipment and intangibles are technologically
identical (have the same depreciation rate). We can thus attribute their
different results purely to differences in tax treatment.
It remains to specify the interest rate. Hall chooses as his starting
point an assumed real after—corporate—tax interest rate of .04.Inthe
absence of inflation, this is our (l—u)i. We also consider .02 and .06
as alternative assumed values of (l—u)i. Whereas Hall takes Modified
Fisher's Law (4b) as given, we want to look at the effect of varying this
assumption. We take Strict Fisher's Law (4a) as an alternative. In each
case we display the results for (l—u)iequal to .02, .04, and .06.
TABLE 2





credit rate k .1 0 0
Economic depreciation
rate .1 .03 .1
Tax depreciation rate 6' .15 .06— 18—
Asmentioned above, we consider ten percent inflation with (4a), ten
percent inflation with (4b), and zero inflation,a rate at which the two ver-
sions of Fisher's Law imply the same interest. We thus consider three inflation
assumptions, three distinct saver types, three asset types, and three values
of (l—u)i0. Any single interest—inflation combination can be used in one
direction to determine the social return on each investment, p, or in the
other direction to determine the return to each saver, s. The values of p
and s for all of these combinations are displayed in Table 3.
Readers are advised to spend a few minutes absorbing Table 3. Notice,
for example, that because intangibles are expensed, this form of investment
is effectively untaxed at the corporate level (Ps). The column of real
returns on intangibles just shows the behavior of the real after—corporate—
tax interest rate under the various assumptions. With Strict Fisher's Law
and low values of (l—u)i, this interest rate is negative. The column
of real returns to tax—exempt debt holding savers, 5d' shows what happens
to i—it under the various assumptions. With Modified Fisher's Law, the
real rate of return to tax—exempt debt holders rises sharply with infla-
tion.
Readers can now construct their own effective tax rates. First, choose
a row of Table 3.Second, subtract from any real social rate of return
p, any saver's real return s in that row. Third, decide whether to divide
by the former, the latter, or not at all. In the remainder of this paper,













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































111.1. Tax Rates are Sensitive to the Interest Rate
The first of our three points is very simple, now that the apparatus
of Section II is available: effective tax rate estimates depend on the
assumed interest rate. Given ii,the interest rate determines p. Thus
each tax rate, such as or isa function of the interest rate.
c e d
Different tax estimates will result from different interest rates used as input.
Later,we shall develop the point that tax rates are also sensitive to
how inflation affects nominal interest rates. To abstract from that point
here, consider the simple case with no inflation. Table 4, Part A, displays
the various gross tax rates under these circumstances.
Let us pause to study the numbers in Table 4A. Looking across any
row, say for (l—u)i =.04,we see the expected wide range of effective
rates applicable to different holders of different types of claims on dif-
ferent forms of real capital. The effective corporate tax rate on intangibles
is zero, because this asset receives immediate expensing,which is equivalent
to eliminating the tax. The corporation equates p on this investment
to the after—tn return it can earn on other assets, (l-.u)i. Sincei is
the rate of return received by tax—exempt bondholders, their impliedeffective
tax rate is negative: t(p—i)/p=—u/(l—u)-85 percent. The holder of
equity, on the other hand, pays a tax of 28 percent (theassumed value of
me) on p (l—u)i.
Still for (l—u)i0 =.04,the effective corporate rate on structures
is 37 percent, below the statutory rate of 46 percent. This difference re-
flects depreciation allowances in excess of economic depreciation. The
percent





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ofcorporate income. Finally for structures, the rate on debt is —16
percent. This subsidy is less than the subsidy for intangibles because
structures do not receive immediate expensing. This asset has a higher
marginal social rate of return while the return to debt—holding savers is
the same.
The three tax rates for equipment follow a similar pattern. Invest-
ment tax credits and accelerated depreciation imply a near zero corporate
rate, while the rate on equity is higher and debt is lower.
Now we turn to examination of the columns of Table 4A, that is, to the
effect of varying the assumed interest rate. We note immediately that the
effective taxes on intangibles are unaffected while those on equipment move
rather dramatically. The former result follows from the fact that the various
tax rates are simple multiples of (1—u), independent of 1. Put another
way, there are no delayed taxes or benefits with immediate expensing, so
the discount rate does not matter.
The behavior of the effective taxes on equipment can be understood by
re—examining three aspects of equation (2). First, the return on the invest-
ment is indeed taxed at rate u. Second, it receives investment tax credit
at rate k. Third, it receives accelerated depreciation since 5' >6(we
can ignore historical cost problems here since iiiszero). When the dis-
count rate (l—u)i0 is low, the future depreciation advantages are relative-
ly more important. Together with the investment tax credit, they outweigh
the corporate tax, and a net subsidy results. As the discount rate increases,
accelerated depreciation becomes less and less important until the corporate
tax outweighs the credits and deductions,so a net tax results.
The effective tax rates for structures turn out to be less sensitive to— 23—
theinterest rates in the range considered here. Because structures do not
qualify for the investment credit, the effective corporate tax rate must be
at least zero.
The sensitivity to the Interest rate remains even when there Is in-
flation. Let us continue to delay the issue of how inflation affects nominal
interest rates. For now, just consider the case of equation (4b),
where the real after—corporate—tax interest rate (l—u)i—TT is constant.
The nominal Interest rate starts with no inflation at i=I ,andincreases
0
to ii + /(l—u) with Inflation at rate ir of 10 percent. Resulting
effective tax rate estimates are shown in Table 4B.
Again the tax rates with (l—u)i =.04reproduce estimates from Hall's
paper. Again the tax rates on intangibles are insensitive to this interest
rate, except for t.Theinsensitive tax rates result from the fact that
the real after—tax interest rate is constant. For tax—exempt bondholders,
however, the real return rises because the equilibrium market interest rate
increases by more than the inflation rate. The higher is the inflation rate
(relative to the rate of return) the larger is this subsidy.
Tax rates for equipment and structures in Table 4B may appear to be
fairly stable, but only because of the range for I. Hall reports a 44 percent
tax rate at (l—u)i0 =.04,while the table shows a lower rate (40%)at .06
and a higher rate (54%) at .02. In fact, as (l—u)iis reduced further,
the tax rate gets even higher. This sensitivity is displayed dramatically
in Figure 1, which plots t for equipment against the real after—tax in-
terestrate (l—u)i(l—u)i—ir with ten percent Inflation. With (l—u)i






















































































































































































































111.2.The Denominator Can Be Zero
Our second caveat concerns the manner in which a given tax wedge is
expressed. Even if we agree on an intercst rate (in order to set aside the
problems of the previous section), the resulting tax rate estimate might
Imply that the entire return to investors Is financed by government through
investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation allowances that outweigh
the corporate tax. The required return on the investment, p, may be zero.
In this case the rate of tax (p—s)/p is not defined. If the saver
obtains a positive rate of return, it is paid entirely by a tax subsidy.
While the gross tax rate is undefined, the net tax rate Is defined and equals
—100 percent. However, there Is no insurance against s going to zero either.
The real net of tax return of savers has even been negative in riskiess terms
with inflation. The remaining alternative is merely to report the total
wedge t"p—s. This value can be Interpreted as a "propertytax" rate, the
percentage of asset—value paid in tax each year.
To illustrate the relevance of this problem,consider the corporate tax rates
on equipment without Inflation. These tax rates are reportedfor selected
interest rates on the left side of Table 4A. They arealso reproduced in
Figure 2 for all interest rates between zeroand (l—u)i0.06. With high
interest rates (.06), accelerated depreciation has alow present value, and
a small net tax results. At (l—u)i0=.04,as reported in Hall, tax credit
and depreciation advantages just about balancethe tax at rate u, with an
effective corporate tax rate of nearly zero.With lower interest rates, the
depreciation advantage is more important, pis always less than (1—u)10,
and t (the numerator of Is always negative. Near (l—u)i .014,
C C 0
































































































































































interestrates below .014, however, p in the denominator is also nega-
tive, with the anomalous result that t is positive. In no senseis there
a positive tax rate in this region, sincep<(1—u)i0, yet will be
positive.
TABLE 5
AlternativeExpressions for the Effective Corporate Rate
(Equipment, No Inflation)
(l—u)i t' =P—s =t'/P t' =tw/s
0 C C C C CC C
.01 —1.45 322 —145
.02 —1.02 —104 —51
.04 —.08 —2 0
.06 .93 13 16
.08 2.00 20 25
t'isa percent of asset—value paid in tax each year.The other
taxratesare expressed as a percent of the capital. incomeflow.
Table5 summarizes the possibilities for this example of the effective
corporate tax on equipment with noinflation. The use of isnot really
acceptable,because the subsidy at .01appears as a + 322 percent tax. The
netrate t'seemsto make more sense, since the sign is correct— 28—
here.However, Table 3 reveals that Sc could also be negative in the
denominator of t. In such a case, a subsidy would again appear as a
positive net tax rate. Furthermore1 both gross and net tax rates are sub-
ject to misleadingly wide variation when their denominators areclose to
zero.
These considerations seem to point toward the use oft' alone; we
do not need a denominator. This effective tax always has the right sign
and is not so sensitive to small changes in the assumption about interest
rates. However, the problem of the assumed interest ratedoes not vanish.
The tax wedge t' does become larger as the rate of return increases, even
though the rate of tax levels off as seen in Figure 2.
The moral seems to be that analysts should report the underlying
components p and s, as well as summary figures such as tax wedges, gross
tax rates, or net tax rates. They should also include a discussionof the
sensitivity of these figures to the underlying assumptions. Tofollow our
own advice, we report tax wedges in Table 6 for each assetand inflation
scenario.This table has the same format as Table 4.
111.3. The Inflation Assumption Matters
Fisher'soriginal law predicted that I would increase by iTin
aworld with no taxes. Since most investment takes place in corporations
with tax rate u, however, one is tempted to adopt the modified viewthat
should increase by n/(l—u), keeping constant the real Interestrate after
corporate taxes. This is the basis forHall's assumption.
There are, however, influences which weaken the a priori casefor
this outcome. First, not all investors have the same marginalrate. If































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































argumentbehind Fisher's Law would imply that I increase only by n,
to keep their real (riontaxed) interest rate constant. Second, even if all
tax ratesdid equalu, historical cost depreciation and taxation of
nominal capital gains will tend to reduce the real net return on invest-
ments when there is inflation. These features imply that the interest rate
would tend to rise by less than 1T/(l—u) with inflation.
Feldstein—Surnrners (1978) have estimated that inflation adds approxi-
mately point—for—point to nominal interest rates. This is not the result
of a simple Fisher's Law without taxes. Rather, it is the result of two
countervailing forces within the tax system: taxation of nominal interest
at some average rate, call it m, tends to raise i by 111(1—tn), while
historical cost depreciation and taxation of nominal capital gains tend to
pull the adjustment below this level.
Jorgenson and Sullivan also use empirical work to support their assumption
of a constant real after—tax rate of return on corporate investment. This
estimated constancy would appear to contradict the results of Feldstein and
Summers. The difference can be reconciled by a limitation on arbitrage be-
tween bonds and real capital, implicitly invoked by i—S. With such a limita-
tion, real after—tax interest rates could fall with inflation (Feldstein and
Summers), while real after—tax rates of return are constant (J—S). In terms
of our analysis, the J—S procedure is equivalent to assuming Modified Fisher's
Law as far as effective corporate and equity tax rates are concerned. Cal-
culating effective tax rates applicable to bondholders would require a
separate model of interest determination.
The choice between Strict and Modified Fisher's Laws does affect tax
rate estimates. As is clear from Table 3, the required real social returns
on investment, p, and the real net return to savers, s, depend critically
on how inflation affects the nominal interest rate.— 31—
Considerfirst the Strict Fisher's Law of equation (4a). With ten
percent inflation, Table 3 shows low and even negative required real rates
of return on investment. If the demand for capita]. is inversely related to
this required return, (4a) implies an increased capital stock. At the same
time, Table 3 shows lower real rewards to saving under Strict Fisher's Law.
If the supply of savings is positively related to its real net return,
this would imply a decreased capital stock. The nominal interest rate would
have to increase by more than ir to encourage savers to supply enough capital
to meet investment demand. The figures in Table 3 by themselves cannot repre-
sent an equilibrium.
Now consider Modified Fisher's Law (4b). The large nominal interestin-
crease associated with inflation implies a higher requiredreal return on two
of the three illustrative asset categories of Table 3. The higher required
p would suggest lower incentives to invest. Atthe same time, however, most
savers are receiving higher real returns with inflation.These Table 3 figures
cannot be in equilibrium, either. Only if interest ratesincreased by some-
thing less than /(l—u) would savers' desired wealthmatch the producers' de-
sired capital.
Thus equations (4a) and (4b) represent two logical possibilitiesfor an
unknown relationship: the truth is likely to lie somewherein between. If
the assumption of Hall and J—S is correct, then gross tax rateswith i.l
will look like Part B of Table 4. If, on the other hand, estimatesfrom
Feldstein—Summers (1978) are correct, gross tax rates withit=.l will look
like Part C of Table 4.
Table 4C illustrates some of the difficulties to whicheffective tax
rates are subject. The corporate rates on equipmentand structures are nega—32 —
tivewhen (1—u)i0 Is .02. As can be confirmed by reference to Table 3
these are cases of negative social rates of return. Since the return received
by a 46 percent bondholder is even more negative, these negative numbers in
4C reflect a positive tax. At higher values of (l—u)I, relatively large
positive corporate tax rates are shown. If we compare the tax rates here to
those with no inflation in 4A, we might draw the conclusion that inflation
effects a disincentive to Invest. Again, a glance at the social rates of
return in Table 3 will confirm that P is sharply lower with inflation and
Strict Fisher's Law. This can only be the result of Increased Investment,
which pushes down the marginal rate of return. Such an outcome Is to be
expected, since inflation lowers real corporate borrowing costs under this as-
sumption. The relative Increase In effective tax rates is simply the result
of much smaller denominators in the gross tax rate formula.
One last anomaly will complete the catalog of illustrations. Look at
intangibles in the bottom right-hand corner of Table 4. We now have out-
rageous t tax rates between —694 percent and +1335 percent. Table 3 or 6
reveals that the wedge (P_sd) is in fact negative for all three values of
(l—u)i. For .02 and .04, however, this subsidy is larger than the saver's
return, and p is negative in the denominator. We thus have negative numbers
In Table 4 reflecting positive taxes, and positive numbers in the table
reflecting negative taxes.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Table 4 exemplifies three separate conclusions. Tax ratesare sensitive
to the interest rate (.02, .04, .06), tax rates are sensitive to the assumed
effect of inflation on nominal interest (part B vs.part C), and tax rates
are not best expressed as a percent of gross capital incomep— 33—
Beyondthe three major caveats discussed in this paper, there exist
other more subtle problems. We are forced by the limits of this paper to
abstract from them, as have other studies. However, we might take a few
paragraphs to outline these problems for the sequel.
Different effective tax rates are useful for different purposes. First,
one may want an average tax rate or "flow of funds" rate to capture income
effects, as described in our introduction. Second, there are different types
of marginal tax rates. Capital income can increase because of higher rates
of return or because of more investment. Since only the latter induces an
investment credit, for example, the effect on taxes is not the same.
Feldstein and Summers (1979) are not interested in the additional tax
associated with another unit of investment. Instead, they seek to measure
the effects of inflation on taxes. They need to specify the effect of
inflation on nominal interest rates as well as the effect of nominal inter-
est rates on real taxes paid.
Third, even if we agreed on marginal tax rates for additional investment,
we might want an effective corporate rate, an effective personal rate, or
the total effective wedge between the marginal product and the saver's rate
of time preference. Consider for a moment the use of each such rate. The
assumptions of our investment model rely heavily on a single market interest
rate. Given this baseline for all corporate investment, the "effective
corporate tax rates" can be used to measure the misallocations of capital
among assets in the corporate sector. They cannot be used, for example,
to capture misallocations between the corporate and noncorporate sectors.
Given the same market interest rate as a baseline, different savers earn
different net of tax returns. Thus "personal effective tax rates" can be— 34—
usedto measure a "misallocation" of savings in the personal sector: not
all marginal rates of time preference are identical. Finally, only the
total effective wedge between the marginal social rate of return p (aver-
aged over different assets), and the marginal rate of time preference s
(averaged over different savers), can be used to measure the misallocation
of consumption between present and future periods, as caused by capital
income taxation.
Analyses of allocative and distributive effects are hampered by the
questionable consistency of the tax rates estimated with the assumption of
overall equilibrium in capitalmarkets.2lCondition (2) expresses the
requirement that the corporation should have maximized its profits in
equilibrium. There can then be no potential for the corporation to gain
by arbitrage between bonds and real capital. There are, however, other
conditions one might wish to hold. For example, it might be required that
profits of noncorporate investors from the same sort of arbitrage be elimina-
ted. Equilibrium would then call for the analogue of condition (2), but with
the proprietor's marginal rate in replacing the corporate marginal rate u.
But (2) cannot hold for both inandu .(unlessthey are equal).
For the model to tell a consistent story about the effect of taxes,
it is necessary to find a way for corporations, individuals, and tax—
exempt institutions to be in equilibrium simultaneously. There are
two basic ways such a reconciliation might be accomplished. The first
is to adopt assumptions that constrain the agents of the model. For
example, it seems natural to impose borrowing limits on individuals,
and to limit negative positions in (short sales of) real capital. One—35
might simultaneously assume that corporate and noncorporate technologies
are distinct, so that investment opportunities available to corporations
are not available to other firms.
By a careful combination of such restrictions, a consistent model
should be feasible. At this stage, the point to emphasize is that the
particular constraints imposed are likely to have a significant bearing
on the distorting consequences attributable to taxes.Take as an example
the constraint that tax—exempt savings by individuals are subject to
fixed ceilings. This assumption Is likely to eliminate any allocative
effects of the sort of subsidy to zero bracket bondholders that is
apparent from Table 4 or Table 6.
The method of imposing constraints is likely to imply extreme
specialization of portfolios. Individuals will hold only stock or bonds,
for example, not both. The rates of return in the analysis above are
treated as certain, and hence no one would hold assets generatingdif-
ferent yields. Actual assets, however, are risky. Thus a second
approach to resolving the problem of inconsistency is to attempt an
explicit treatment of risk.
This undertaking would clearly be difficult, but it is important to
explore. The effect of taxing the return to saving maybe quite different
from the effects of taxing risk premia. As shown in Gordon (1981),and
as estimated in Fullerton—Gordon (1981), a tax onrisk premia may con-
stitute a simple risk sharing by government, with no distortingeffect
at all.
Pending modelling advances along the lines described here, wewould
urge those who construct and use effective tax ratesto exercise appro-
priate caution.FOOTNOTES
1. By the real rate of return P we mean the internal rate of return
of the project's real cash flow, gross of taxes and subsidies. Be-
cause we confine our attention to simple cases, this rate is always
well defined.
2. Note we have assumed that the corporation will actually manage to use
its investment credit and that it will benefit from the subsequent de-
preciation allowances. This assumption is far from innocuous because
the actual income tax is nonlinear. This nonlinearity is obvious for
the case of most individuals, but also holds for corporations risking
low or negative taxable income. We have also assumed that depreciation
allowances are based on the historical cost of the asset gross of the
investment credit. Finally, note that the cash flow to an individual
asset owner with marginal tax rate m is obtained by substituting m
for u in these expressions.
3. One way of modelling the imperfect substitutability of debt and real
capital is to regard the corporatipn as subject to constraints on this
arbitrage, e.g., the outstanding debt cannot exceed some fraction of
the value of real assets owned. In this case the relationship (1) will
not generally hold for firms where the constraint binds. Other re-
lationships must then determine c/q. See, for example, King (1977).
However, the assumption (if only implicit) of unconstrained debt—real
capital arbitrage is frequently encountered.
4. Stiglitz [1980] has emphasized that if we really did the analysis "right",and i would be simultaneouSlY determined asendogenous variables.
5. To our knowledge the first published appearanceof Modified Fisher's
Law was in Feldstein (1976).
6. If we use Modified Fisher's Law (4b) toeliminate the current interest










Equation (2b) is equivalent toHall's crucial equation, except for
notational differences. Hall's d andd' correspond to our 6 and
iS',andhis taxable proportion of capital gains, g,is set to zero.
Hall's "real after—tax interest rate," r
(assumed constant) is what we
have cal1d (l—u)i0.Equation (3b) is the basic equilibriumcondition
of Jorgenson—Sullivan, with their"rate of return," r (assumed con-
stant) equal to our 1.
7. There is a question of consistencyor existence of equilibriumif the
same taxpayer were to earndifferent after—tax rates of return on
different assets. The concludingsection of this paper touches on
possible resolutions of this problem.
8. See Bailey (1969) for morediscussion on this point.
9. For analyses stressing this problem,see Bradford (1980, 1981).REFERENCES
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